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An Obscure Scandal of Consciousness
Anthony Chase
and now, divided-
with you-doesn't the world-or at least
that part which holds power-seem worthy only
of rancor and an almost mystical contempt?
Yet without your rigor, I survive because
I do not choose. I live in the non-will
of the dead postwar years: loving
the world I hate, scorning it, lost
in its wretchedness-in an obscure scandal
of consciousness...*
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay provides an introduction to American popular culture, spe-
cifically designed to be of use to those interested in evaluating the relation-
ship between law, lawyers, and public consciousness or popular values as
they have developed within American society. 1 It is fair to ask from the
outset what possible justification there can be for devoting even a short
essay like this one to such a project. One could quite easily argue that
legal scholarship itself is governed by a popular front composed of ortho-
dox as well as avant-garde scholars, united around a common purpose,
equally committed to obscuring the identity and historical profile of those
who actually hold power. Does not a focus upon lawyers and popular
culture represent merely one more effort to avoid confronting any actual
sociology of the system which the rulers manipulate to their advantage?
* P. Pasolini, The Ashes of Gramsci, Poems 11 (N. MacAfee trans. 1982).
1. For a bibliography of resources available for the study of law, lawyers, and popular culture, see
Chase, On Teaching Law and Popular Culture, 3 Focus on Law Studies: Teaching About Law in
the Liberal Arts 7, 8 (Spring 1988); works subsequently published or inadvertently omitted from the
Focus bibliography include American Media and Mass Culture: Left Perspectives (D. Lazere ed.
1987); Bloomfield, Law and Lawyers in American Popular Culture, in C. Smith, J. McWilliams &
M. Bloomfield, Law and American Literature 125 (1983); Rowe, Power in Prime Time: Miami Vice
and L.A. Law, 33 Jump Cut 20 (Feb. 1988); Stark, Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett: The History
of Lawyers and the Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 229 (1987); Heller, The
Secrets of Columbo, 66 Telos 133 (Winter 1985-86); Zaslove, In Search of Columbo, 70 Telos 161
(Winter 1986-87); Film and History (Special Issue), 41 Radical Hist. Rev. 3 (April 1988); E. Long,
The American Dream and the Popular Novel (1985); Political Mythology and Popular Fictions (E.
Yanarella & L. Sigelman eds. 1988); T. Christensen, Reel Politics (1987); J. Cawelti, Adventure,
Mystery, and Romance (1976); W. Westbrook, Wall Street in the American Novel (1980).
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From "strict construction" through "deconstruction," the dominant tra-
dition of American legal writing seems to have been devoted to futile ef-
forts at ignoring social context, within which real power can be analyzed
and countered.' However oriented, is not writing about the relationship
between law and popular culture simply one more example of otherwise
unemployable, middle-class intellectuals accepting the transfer payments
made possible by the university welfare system in exchange for the kind of
obscure and pedantic research which promotes nothing at all save aca-
demic careers?' Should we not regard popular culture itself as a scandal
of at least some sort, a likely source of wretchedness, if not dementia, for
any reasonably intelligent person seduced by its cheap attractions and
ready allure?
The answer to questions like these must be found in the concrete work
carried forward by people who write about law, lawyers, and popular
culture. My view is that once sufficient time and care have been devoted
to analyzing the emerging set of problems and materials which connect
the world of popular art and everyday experience to that of legal institu-
tions and practices, it will become apparent that useful contributions have
been made to the sociology of culture, including legal culture. Under-
standing popular legal culture might even make possible more rigorous
thinking about the relation between law, politics, and social change in the
United States.
Let us briefly consider, then, the realm of "legal institutions and prac-
tices," in a readily accessible law review article. Jammed into a recent
issue of The Texas Law Review, behind essays on loss causation in securi-
ties fraud litigation as well as unifying servitudes and defeasible fees in
property law, I found a brief comment by labor law professor Julius
Getman under the simple title, "Voices." 4 Getman identifies several ways
of talking about law which are also ways of approaching legal writing and
education: professional voice, critical voice, scholarly voice, and human
voice. While recognizing the obvious legitimacy of professional voice
2. Regarding law not as a system of social relations but, rather, a text in need of interpretation,
legal scholars tend to "abet power's visceral escape from accountability." Chase, A Note on the
Aporias of Critical Constitutionalism, 36 Buffalo L. Rev. (1988); see also West, Adjudication Is Not
Interpretation: Some Reservations about the Law-as-Literature Movement, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 203,
207 (1987).
Ironically, given the close relationship between law and the state, none of the dominant schools of
American legal scholarship (from 'neutral principles' through Critical Legal Studies) has even begun
to develop a coherent theory of state power. For scholars who have begun this task, however, see M.
Carnoy, The State and Political Theory (1984); F. Block, Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics
and Postindustrialism (1987); M. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism,
1890-1916: The Market, The Law, and Politics (1988).
3. See R. Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe (1987);
Scialabba, What are the Intellectuals Good For?, 7 Grand Street 194 (Spring 1988); Wald, Jacoby's
Complaint, 55 Radical Historians Newsletter 1 (May 1988); Lukes, Piccone, Siegel & Taves, Round-
table on Intellectuals and the Academy, 71 Telos 5 (Spring 1987); Symposium on Russell Jacoby's
The Last Intellectuals, 73 Telos 167 (Fall 1987).
4. Getman, Voices, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 577 (1988).
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within the law, Getman questions whether such an exclusive discourse is
entirely adequate to prepare law students for the kind of advocacy, negoti-
ation, and counseling responsibilities central to most legal practice. Pro-
fessional voice within legal scholarship is equally suspect since its use
((only rarely is as moving or interesting as the problems and human situa-
tions from which it derives."'
Realistically anticipating sharp resistance by professional educators to
his preference for human voice over the "respectable" alternatives,
Getman nevertheless sticks to his guns and concludes his critique of elite
discourse with the assertion that "[in] most cases, when we present our
ideas in a form designed to separate us from the great mass of humanity,
we are almost certain to obscure their meaning, limit their reach, and
reduce their significance."1
7
There remains a troubling feature to Getman's endorsement of human
voice, yet one which has the virtue of leading us into the realm of law and
popular culture. While it is correct to suggest, as Getman does, that
human voice often reveals truths unspoken by professional or scholarly
discourse, the question remains: what are we to do with the conflicting
experiences of reality reflected in different human voice accounts of the
same world? The human voices which Getman permits to speak through
his essay could seemingly be included among a harmonious chorus stand-
ing on the dais at the Democratic Party convention. Setting to one side the
disparity between human voice and the predominant voices which charac-
terize legal-academic speech, how do we evaluate the various claims to
insight or veracity offered by contending instances of human voice cri-
tique? What if Getman's human voice rendition of racial discrimination,
for example, had come not from a civil rights lawyer but from the subjects
of Vincent Crapanzano's anthropological study of contemporary white
South Africans, many of whose personal voices are raised in defense of
apartheid? 8 In other words, how do we know which all too human voice
to trust?
One response to this problem is found in the classical integration of
human voice with scholarly voice, well-represented in the grand style of
American historical writing by William Appleman Williams. A more re-
cent approach, illustrated by sociologist William J. Wilson in his power-
ful 1988 lecture at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government provides a
devastating and systematic critique in the scholarly voice, and then brings
the entire analysis "back home" with a sudden transition into human
5. Id. at 579. See also Chase, American Legal Education Since 1885: The Case of the Missing
Modern, 30 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 519 (1985); Chase, Who Needs Information When You're Working
Underground? Legal Education, Social Context, and the Public Interest, 12 Nova L. Rev. 55
(1987).
6. Getman, supra note 4, at 579.
7. Id. at 588.
8. V. Crapanzano, Waiting: The Whites of South Africa (1985).
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voice at the conclusion. Wilson's utilization of field research at the most
human level of struggle for survival perfectly reinforces his general claim
that American social policy has been woefully misdirected in its search for
a "culture of poverty" inherent in the life-style of the poor and should
instead focus on the inevitable victimization inherent in the social and eco-
nomic trap set for the poor by a racist system.' Once it is fully realized
how frequently professional, scholarly, and critical voices are used to ob-
scure the truth of human voice accounts-and, also, fully understood how
politically motivated such suppression can be-then it becomes possible to
imagine a rehabilitation of formerly exclusive voices, now in conjunction
with a radical project which combines different kinds of speech in a single
message.
Another approach to this problem of conflicting human-voice accounts,
one which also situates human voice in relation to a broader background
of still intimately human speech, involves the notion of popular voice-the
idea of human voice spoken thfough the media of American popular cul-
ture. The very prevalence of a culture across a range of social strata qual-
ifies it as "popular" culture. Thus, in an important respect, popular voice
by definition incorporates human voice. It is the immediate and the per-
sonal transposed from the private sphere to the public, from the isolation
of the individual to the silver screen stretched across one entire wall of the
theater, or via the glowing boxes bringing light to countless evening living
rooms, where "the whole world is watching."1 Without in any way at-
tempting to ignore the complexity of the process through which the per-
sonal or intimate voice, that is, the human voice, can become the soul of
popular entertainment-in the hands of corporations or disc jockeys, ad-
vertisers or screenwriters, stand-up comics or network presidents (or
ticket-takers at Disneyland)-we might find a way to integrate Getman's
notion of human voice with an approach which remains concerned, in the
end, with the big picture by focusing on popular culture and the way in
which popular culture mediates the experience of law and legal institu-
tions for most Americans.
II. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: AMERICAN FILM SCHOLARSHIP
The general purpose of this essay is to provide a kind of map to orient
the reader within the terrain of current popular legal culture in the
United States. Although I will eventually move from the general to the
particular,11 (specifically, Scott Turow's bestselling novel, Presumed In-
9. See W. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy
(1987).
10. Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching, in Transmission: Theory and Practice for a new Tele-
vision Aesthetics 63 (P. D'Agostino ed. 1985).
11. Cf a comment by filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard: "Jean-Louis Baudry has published an article
in Les Lettres Fran~aises. As I was reading it, I kept saying, 'This is really good writing! Here's a
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nocent), I raise here the most visible cautionary flag that I am able to
raise, with respect to the potential misuse of popular culture research. In
particular, I can warn readers against analyses which pretend to show
how popular legal culture is the essential ideological matrix within which
Americans are duped into supporting a corrupt system of legal institu-
tions. To me, the vistas opened up by popular culture research that dem-
onstrates the way works of popular art often reflect social experience and
patterns of organization of perception that otherwise might escape our
view, remain limitless. But the pressure to manipulate analyses of popular
culture in order to somehow validate errant notions about the role of ideo-
logical power in reproducing social reality is also limitless and the willing-
ness to submit to such pressures may be considerable among legal intellec-
tuals. There is no natural point where further attribution of legal
ideology's capacity to dominate would be logically checked by common
sense. Ideology "surpasses experience," as Parsons suggests, and the room
to play out fantasies becomes infinite."'
Having made this essential point, I would like to proceed by doing
something which is rarely attempted within legal scholarship, even while
law school professors are rapidly integrating the approaches of other aca-
demic disciplines into the law school world: that is, assess the debates over
method in other disciplines before adopting them uncritically, and thus
perhaps avoid repeating the mistakes made by earlier scholars in other
fields.
From the vantage point of the summer of 1988, historian Robert Sklar
looked back over the previous fifteen or twenty years of American film
teaching and scholarship, in some ways the entire modern history of this
discipline within the academic community, and reported on the central
controversy created by the introduction into film history of rather superfi-
cial models of Althusserian or Gramscian "ideological hegemony," a con-
ception of the relation of film to society which radically simplified the film
scholar's task. Sklar observes:
Imagine the potency of this conception for a hypothetical scholar
steeped in theory, unfamiliar with the training historians receive in
historiographic procedure (Thompson's notorious "historical logic").
Like an expressway elevated over a teeming city, Althusser's formu-
lation might be seen to offer a royal road to cinema history without
guy who ought to write something on Persona. He'd do a really good job.' The thing is, the article I
was reading was supposed to be an article on Persona." Bontemps et al., Struggle on Two Fronts: A
Conversation with Jean-Luc Godard, Film Q., Winter 1968, at 20, 26.
12. For more skeptical views of the significance of ideology than those popular among current
critical texts, see I M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning
to A.D. 1760 (1986); J. Merquior, The Veil and the Mask: Essays on Culture and Ideology (1979);
W. Abercrombie, S. Hill & B. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (1980); G. Therborn, The
Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (1980). Although these are the key works in the field,
they remain terra incognita for all the critical legal scholars.
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the necessity of descending into the mean streets of historical re-
search (let alone the coal mines historians frequently mention as
metaphors for their place of labor), where historians "are always
handling facts in bunches and in series," as Thompson insists.
Within this framework, a film industry is by definition an ideologi-
cal state apparatus. Films "represent" ideology and "interpellate"
individuals as subjects. Ideology flows smoothly from its source
(whether this is the state, the bourgeoisie or capitalism, or a compen-
dium of all three, is not often clarified or specified) through the film
production and distribution process into the spectator's willing eyes
and ears. From the elevation of this theoretical stance, the work that
historians do-researching questions of historical agency, of conflict
and transformation-becomes more or less immaterial."
This is a small but important segment of his overall analysis of what has
been useful or promising, as well as what has been rejected or miscon-
ceived, within American film studies-particularly in relation to the sim-
plistic and reductionist "critique of ideology" in film history. Fortunately
for this discipline, the unexamined relationship between film content and
the actual process of film consumption can no longer be glossed over. The
emphasis on ideology has given way to a new respect for the complexity
inherent in the way people actually put culture to use in their lives. The
addiction to scholarly deconstruction of popular cultural "texts" in terms
of straightforward ideological messages has given way to a greater interest
in how popular culture may tell us something about the way in which a
society conceives of itself. A more modest emphasis on reflection theories
as opposed to ideological power theories seems to characterize much cur-
rent film historical research.
Another response to the fashionable schools of ideological critique is
provided by Anne Karpf, in her review of recent developments in British
film history:
The discovery of pleasure as a respectable research topic is one of
the most striking developments in recent media research. Where once
ideology was assumed to be mass culture's organizing principle, and
the pernicious effects of all but a handful of media texts were taken
(literally and metaphorically) as read, now researchers are falling
over each other to reclaim hitherto derided genres, and account for
and legitimate their popularity. This rehabilitation of the audience is
a valuable development ....
There are problems with this renewed interest in the history and sociology
(as opposed to ideology) of mass media, but many film and popular cul-
13. Sklar, Oh.' Althusser! Historiography and the Rise of Cinema Studies, 41 Radical Hist. Rev.
11, 13 (April 1988).
14, Karpf, Book Review, 9 Media Culture & Soc. 119 (Jan. 1987).
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ture scholars have taken the right step, away from simply reading perni-
cious effects into the unmediated contents of popular works. Unfortu-
nately, the same can not yet be said with regard to another form of critical
theory, this one with even closer relations to current analysis of popular
legal culture: Critical Legal Studies (CLS).
III. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
Just as a real familiarity with some of the wrong turns taken in the
past fifteen years of film historical scholarship can save a great deal of
time in any initial effort to develop a critique of popular culture in the
U.S., a brief survey of the contradictions within CLS theory might also
prove useful. Since reference to any brief survey of CLS seems hopeless, I
am content to provide an illustration of just one central contradiction
within CLS which has immediate relevance to writing about popular
culture.
Stanford law professor Robert Gordon, a leading CLS spokesperson,
describes a new book by his colleague Mark Kelman as a kind of critical
legal handbook, "an excellent, though demanding, introduction to C.L.S.
ideas."" 5 Reviewing Kelman's handbook for a radical political periodical,
critic George Scialabba chooses to quote key passages from Kelman's
work as a summary of his (and CLS's) central insight. Legal rules, so
goes the critique, "are part of a collective effort to pacify and reassure us
that we have been delivered from existential tragedy. Rules are the opiate
of the masses."1
It is clear that the central insight of CLS is that legal rules and liberal
legal reasoning as a whole are the source of "false consciousness" in
American society and have prevented Americans from perceiving their sit-
uation as one of true exploitation. Marx, of course, had something differ-
ent in mind. For him, religion was not "false consciousness" but rather, a
thin blanket against the bone-chilling winds of an austere capitalist soci-
ety. Marx and Engels identified the role of religion/opium in terms of
"the spirit of spiritless conditions," and "the heart of a heartless world."
It is difficult to imagine how anyone could regard the rule against perpe-
tuities, the doctrine of contributory negligence, the parol evidence rule, the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil or many other legal rules and doc-
trines as "the spirit of spiritless conditions." To argue that the technical
rules of doctrinal law systematically dissected within CLS writing are
even known to Kelman's "masses" (let alone regarded by them in the
same way Marx felt religion might be regarded) is to argue a proposition
which truly "surpasses experience" and constitutes the critical scholar's
15. Gordon, Law and Ideology, 3 Tikkun 14, 86 (Jan./Feb. 1986).
16. M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 63 (1987), quoted in Scialabba, Critical Legal
Studies: Rules as Pacifiers of the Masses, Zeta Mag., May 1988, at 64, 65.
1988]
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own blind spot, an ideology immune to analysis. Indeed, it might be more
appropriate to argue that in America today, the opium of the people is not
legal rules (as Kelman would have it), but rather, opium (drugs, alcohol,
etc.). 17
However familiar this critique of law as false consciousness and decep-
tive ideology may have become to readers of law reviews-or even those
familiar with more popular media-little effort has been made until quite
recently to subject the CLS "dominant ideology thesis"18 to any sort of
serious historical and sociological scrutiny." Thus a thesis about the infi-
nite manipulability of public consciousness which has been sharply re-
jected by important contemporary historical sociologists'0 and systemati-
cally criticized within American film historiography"' has only now, after
a decade of inflated CLS doctrinal exegesis (and revelation), finally been
challenged."
My concern here is simply that an emerging school of popular legal
culture criticism should avoid the dominant ideology thesis as a central
focus of research into how law, lawyers, and popular discourse interact.
For example, in an otherwise interesting and detailed account of the his-
tory of lawyers and the police as television heroes, one current law review
inyestigator asserts that not only is there a general relation between the
way Americans have viewed lawyers and the police over the last several
decades and the way popular culture interprets these figures but that, in
fact,
[what] these television depictions of zealous police tactics translate
17. On the CLS notion of ideology as false consciousness, see, e.g., Frug, The Ideology of Bureau-
cracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276, 1295 (1984). But see Williams, Law, Deconstruction
and Resistance: The Critical Stance of Derrida and Foucault, 6 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 359, 407
(1988) (questioning whether critical demystification undermines anything). On Marx and religion/
opium see 3 K. Marx & F. Engels, Collected Works 175 (1976); Chase, Law and Ideology Critique
Under Spiritless Conditions: A View of the Reagan Years, 17 Cap. U.L. Rev. (1988); see also E.
Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution 1789-1848, at 229 (1962).
18. See W. Abercrombie, S. Hill & B. Turner, supra note 12.
19. But for the inevitable exceptions, as well as crucial social realism, see J. Hurst, The Growth
of American Law: The Law Makers 249-50 (1950) ("People in the United States of all social levels
and at all times mingled respect for law and for doing things in a legal way with an unashamedly
practical attitude toward the law as an instrument. They would use it when it effected a purpose and
otherwise dispense with it more or less openly."); see also Kaplan, Lawyers Get No Respect: But Law
Journal Poll Shows New Yorkers Satisfid with Legal Services, N.Y.L.J., May 23, 1988, at I (con-
trasting popular attitudes toward lawyers with satisfaction experienced by clients); H. McClosky & J.
Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy (1984) (reporting
on continuing American cynicism with respect to the alleged neutrality of the legal system with a
sizable majority believing that corporations and the rich really run the country and "a fair number of
the respondents" believing that "the laws mostly favor the rich."); Navarro, Social Movements and
Class Politics in the US, Socialist Register 425, 430 (R. Miliband, L. Panitch & J. Saville eds. 1988).
20. See, e.g., M. Mann, supra note 12, at 23.
21. See, e.g., Sklar, supra note 13.
22. See, e.g., Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331 (1988). For initial treatment of these issues se
Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 379; Chase, A Chal-
lenge to Workers' Rights, 8 Nova L.J. 671 (1984).
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into is increased public support for both the weakening of constitu-
tional protections, which impede prosecution, and the overall
strengthening of law enforcement mechanisms. As public sentiment
moves more in line with the "crime control" model of law enforce-
ment and less in line with the "due process" model, largely due to
the influence of television, it becomes less likely that extralegal po-
lice actions directed against criminal suspects will draw censure or
even disapproval from large segments of the American public, who
perceive such conduct as effective law enforcement.""
In effect, the author adds two and two and comes up with five. On the
one hand, he attempts to demonstrate interpretively that there have been
certain transformations in popular culture over time. On the other hand,
he tries to show, utilizing empirical data, that there have been certain
changes within public opinion over the same period regarding the cultural
images of police and lawyers. Even assuming that one finds convincing the
separate trajectories of development that the author lays out, there is vir-
tually no reason whatsoever to believe that the changes in public opinion
were all simply a product of the changes in motion picture or television
images. To be sure, it is hard to disagree with the proposition that
changes in American criminal justice and in the actual experience of crime
by citizens who also watch television occasionally will eventually show up
in some form on television. Advertisers and program producers do conduct
market research to determine what the vast television audience might be
willing to buy.
To make the opposite claim, however, that changes in American views
on crime, lawyers, police, the courts, and so forth, are simply the result of
one influence, television, is to repeat the kind of mistake identified above
as characteristic of all "dominant ideology" approaches. Focus on text and
textual interpretation overwhelms social context and the real complexity
of human experience in society. A review of Peter Biskind's study of Cold
War films sums up this point quite nicely:
Seeing Is Believing offers a lot of information about what the scena-
rios written in the 1950s were trying to tell us. But it offers practi-
cally nothing in the way of conclusion. Biskind's thesis is a play that
lacks a third act. Once he has accurately identified the overt or hid-
den message of a film, we are to assume, I suppose, that masses of
people received the message and swallowed it. We are left to fill in
the blanks and to wrestle with the elusive questions of cause and
effect Biskind has bypassed. . . . In other words, why do some
messages we receive from films-in any decade-bounce off us,
while others sink in? What happens to all the conflicting messages
we absorb in the dark? Were the films of the 1950s reflecting us
23. Stark, supra note 1, at 280 (emphasis added).
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more than we were reflecting them? And is it just possible that the
films we see have relatively little influence on us at all-that seeing
is not believing?"'
One need only substitute "CLS" for "Biskind" and "hidden message of a
judicial opinion" for "hidden message of a film" in this critique for the
analysis to reveal the aporias of CLS theory. Popular culture reflects us
more than we reflect it and neither movies nor legal ideology have domi-
nated modern history. To ignore completely not only what happened in
history but also popular culture formats presenting lawyers other than in
television police or trial dramas (e.g., in soap operas) is to radically short-
change the richness of resources at hand."
IV. STATE OF THE ART
Thus a critique of human and popular voice in legal discourse provides
a bridge into the universe of popular legal culture. Learning from the
experience of both American film scholarship and critical legal studies
helps us to avoid one of the key errors in the recent history of cultural
criticism. Now it becomes possible to outline a range of possible choices
within cultural theory. First, obviously, we have ideology critique. Despite
its weaknesses, it still survives. Reviewing a recent collection of essays on
American popular culture edited by Paul Buhle, Alan Milchman argues:
The supposed evidence of a mass media awash with the rumblings of
anti-capitalist discontent and subversion, reflecting the creativity of
the masses in their daily lives, strikes me as so much evidence for the
totalitarian domination of capitalism over the "leisure" activity of the
mass of the population. Indeed, sadly, I have found nothing in this
collection to challenge my conviction that the mass media is capital's
organ of mass manipulation.'
Milchman adds that he does not mean to imply that capitalism is capable
of incorporating all opposition, but rather that radical consciousness "can-
not manifest itself in the mass media, in an intact autonomous popular
24. Johnson, The Lonely Crowd at the Movies, The Nation, Dec. 10, 1983, at 606, 607-08 (em-
phasis added).
25. See, e.g., R. Allen, Speaking of Soap Operas (1985); Allen, On Reading Soaps: A Semiotic
Primer, in Regarding Television 97 (E. Kaplan ed. 1983); Modleski, The Rhythms of Reception:
Daytime Television and Women's Work, in id. at 67; Chase, Toward a Legal Theo 7y of Popular
Culture, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 557-559. On serious problems with all theories which take for granted
the relation between content analysis (whether of appellate case decisions or television crime shows)
and a presumed master plan of social control and ideological sorcery, see Aufderheide, Ollie North's
Boss, Christianity & Crisis, Sept. 14, 1987, at 290, 292. Making the identical point with respect to
lawyers and popular culture, see Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media
Portrayals of American Attorneys, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 281, 300.
26. Milchman, Book Review 6 Socialism & Democracy 198, 203 (Spring/Summer 1988).
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culture as was possible in preceding epochs."'1 7 Leaving aside Milchman's
reference to the popular culture of "preceding epochs,"' 6 we may regard
his observation not only as an instance of residual ideology critique but,
also, as a source for identifying its antithesis, what I call "weak-link cri-
tique" or an analysis which conceives of popular culture as the potential
source of breakthroughs in popular consciousness of oppression and cor-
ruption. Seen this way, far from constituting the social imaginary of capi-
tal's domination, popular culture becomes a field of combat. Popular cul-
ture turns the dominant ideology thesis on its head and reappears within
theory as the weak link in world capitalist socialization and manipulation.
Here, it is argued, real breakthroughs in consciousness are possible." I
prefer the weak-link theory to ideology critique, not so much because it
somehow gets closer to the truth of modern living but because it contains
within it a grand permission to actually enjoy the works of popular art-
ists, to love the world we hate ("lost in its wretchedness"). 0
Perhaps the best reason for questioning both of these approaches to
popular culture, however, is that they tend to cancel each other out. Popu-
lar culture cannot simply constitute a form of ideological domination if
instances of revolutionary subjectivity can be identified lurking within va-
rious genres or particular narratives drawn from the popular pantheon.
Nor can popular culture constitute a generally alternative vision of society
if much of its content is determined by those in power (mediated through
the corporate structure of the entertainment industry), and many of its
consequences can be seen as a kind of pacification program. The notion
that contradiction is at the heart of popular culture tends to marginalize
these two initial approaches to critique.
The tendency for each of these total critiques to erode or eliminate its
opposite is particularly revealed where ideology critique and weak-link
theory come up with diametrically opposite readings of precisely the same
cultural or popular texts."1 There is simply too much potentially radical
27. Id. at 204.
28. Debate over the nature of "preceding epochs" in the history of popular culture, specifically
over whether ethnic social groups have actually enjoyed an "intact autonomous" popular culture, is as
interesting as it is intense. See Sklar, supra note 13; see also Allen, Motion Picture Exhibition in
Manhattan: Beyond the Nickelodeon, 18 Cinema J. 2 (Spring 1979); the discussion between Allen
and Charles Musser at 10 Studies in Visual Communication 24 (Fall 1984); Mayne, Immigrants and
Spectators, 5 Wide Angle 32 (1982); Hansen, Early Silent Cinema: Whose Public Sphere, 29 New
German Critique 147 (Spring/Summer 1983).
29. See, e.g., Popular Culture in America (P. Buhle ed. 1987); Jump Cut: Hollywood, Politics,
and Counter-Cinema (P. Steven ed. 1985); The Cineaste Interviews: On the Art and Politics of the
Cinema (D. Georgakas & L. Rubenstein eds. 1983); Cinema and Social Change in Latin America:
Conversations with Film-Makers (J. Burton ed. 1986); C. MacCabe, Godard: Images, Sounds, Polit-
ics (1980); S. Harvey, May '68 and Film Culture (1978); J. Street, Rebel Rock: The Politics of
Popular Music (1986).
30. Pasolini, supra note *, at 11.
31. Cf. A. Dorfman, Of Elephants and Ducks, in The Empire's Old Clothes: What the Lone
Ranger, Babar, and Other Innocent Heroes Do to Our Minds 17 (1983); Kunzle, Introduction to
How to Read Donald Duck, in American Media and Mass Culture: Left Perspectives 516 (D. Lazere
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critique within popular culture for us to be persuaded by the dominant
ideology thesis, but there is also too much "social imaginary" for us to
anticipate that most of popular culture can become the vanguard in sub-
version of consumer society.
82
A third basic approach to the study of popular culture is essentially
materialist in the sense that it emphasizes the place of popular culture as
an industry located within the general economic and productive structure
of society. "As a matter of general theory," remarked the late Raymond
Williams, "it is useful to recognize that means of communication are
themselves means of production, ' 83 and, added Williams, "the means of
communication have a specific productive history, which is always more
or less directly related to general historical phases of productive and tech-
nical capacity."'" Thus far, research in this field has been predominantly
empirical, tending to represent "specialized technical studies of what are
seen as new 'media'-from writing to alphabets through printing to mo-
tion pictures, radio and television. Much indispensable detail has been
gathered in these specialist histories, but it is ordinarily relatively isolated
from the history of the development of general productive forces and social
orders and relationships."" Unless it can be clearly shown how means of
communication, as means of production, necessarily constrain the symbolic
form and content of what is communicated, in relation to historical phases
of productive and technical capacity, then this particular emphasis may
occlude the symbolic and allegorical politics of popular culture.8 6
ed. 1987); Wagner, Donald Duck. An Interview, 7 Radical America 1 (1973); Uncle Scrooge: The
Mines of King Solomon (1987 reissue of 1950s comic book art by Carl Barks for Disney comics);
Uncle Scrooge: Back to the Klondike (also a 1987 reissue); "Disney DuckTales: Armstrong,"
DuckTales (directed by Alan Zaslove & written by Michael Keyes for Disney Animation, 1987).
32. For a sampling of the range of this literature see S. Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: Adver-
tising and the Social Roots of Consumer Culture (1976); S. Ewen & E. Ewen, Channels of Desire:
Mass Images and the Shaping of American Consciousness (1982); cf T. Lovell, Pictures of Reality:
Aesthetics, Politics and Pleasure (1983); B. Nichols, Ideology and the Image (1981); J. Radway,
Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature (1984); E. Rapping, The Look-
ing Glass World of Nonfiction TV (1987); K. Worpole, Dockers and Detectives (1983); Lippard,
Sniper's Nest: Ethnic Images, Zeta Mag., April 1988, at 70; Gitlin, The Talk about Amerika: Post
Mortem on the Politics and Antipolitics of Network Television, 2 Tikkun 14 (1987); Hitchens, Amer-
ican Notes, Times Literary Supplement, Nov. 14, 1986.
33. Williams, Means of Communication as Means of Production, in Problems in Materialism
and Culture 50, 50 (1980); see also The American Film Industry (T. Balio ed. 1976); The
Hollywood Film Industry (P. Kerr ed. 1976); L. Febvre & H-J. Martin, The Coming of the Book:
The Impact of Printing 1450-1800 (D. Gerard trans. 1976).
34. Williams, supra note 33, at 50.
35. Id. at 53-54.
36. See T. Whiteside, The Blockbuster Complex: Conglomerates, Show Business, and Book Pub-
lishing (1981); P. Gedin, Literature in the Marketplace (G. Bisset trans. 1977); W. Benjamin, The
Author as Producer, in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings 22 (E. Jephcott
trans. 1978); Lacy, The Economics of Publishing, or Adam Smith and Literature, in The Sociology
of Art and Literature: A Reader 407 (M. Albrecht, J. Barnett & M. Griff eds. 1970); Radway, The
Book-of-the-Month Club and the General Reader: On the Uses of "Serious" Fiction, 14 Critical
Inquiry 516 (Spring 1988). Each of the works cited here deals in one or another way with how means
of communication, conceived as productive means, may constrain the actual expression of works them-
selves. See also F. Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (1981)
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A fourth approach to popular art analysis derives from an attitude to-
ward culture reflected in comments such as those of Pasolini on art's se-
ductive qualities or of Karpf on the pleasures of the text. 7 As distinct
from ideology, weak-link, and means of production critique, this view con-
ceives of culture generally as something rather abstract and removed from
the straightforward political positions and societal controversies which
threaten social cohesion. In an odd way all art may contribute to ultimate
social stability in this critique. Peter Bfirger suggests that
[with] the help of Herbert Marcuse's theoretical formulation con-
cerning the twofold character of art in bourgeois society. . ., the
avant-gardiste intent can be understood with particular clarity. All
those needs that cannot be satisfied in everyday life, because the
principle of competition pervades all spheres, can find a home in art
because art is removed from the praxis of life. Values such as hu-
manity, joy, truth, solidarity are extruded from life as it were, and
preserved in art. In bourgeois society, art has a contradictory role: it
projects the image of a better order and to that extent protests
against the bad order that prevails. But by realizing the image of a
better order in fiction, which is semblance (Schein) only, it relieves
the existing society of the pressure of those forces that make for
change. They are assigned to confinement in an ideal sphere."s
I find this argument-in fact, BUrger's whole approach to the history of
culture and the specific problematic of the avant-garde-to be original
and helpful. It is useful here, however, to avoid debates over how Mar-
cuse's aesthetics may have altered over time8' or whether Birger or
Habermas more perfectly understands the politics of contemporary avant-
garde culture, 0 and to be content with identification of this fourth ap-
proach to popular art, what we might call (pace Marcuse) "affirmative
critique.' ' 41 We will not even touch the salient question of whether a pop-
ular culture that provides enormous gratification to consumers in ex-
change for ultimate social pliancy or political lethargy can, in any signifi-
cant way, be regarded as "affirmative," unless we mean, as Marcuse
appeared to mean, that it affirms only the status quo. Instead, I will sim-
ply observe the basic discrepancy between levels of access to consciousness
found in ideology critique as opposed to affirmative critique.
on the "symbolic and allegorical politics of" art and culture.
37. See supra notes * & 14.
38. P. Biirger, Theory of the Avant-Garde 50 (M. Shaw trans. 1984).
39. See, e.g., T. Lukes, The Flight into Inwardness: An Exposition and Critique of Herbert
Marcuse's Theory of Liberative Aesthetics (1985); Bokina, Book Review, 68 Telos 164 (Spring 1986)
(reviewing Lukes).
40. See, e.g., Habermas, Modernity Versus Postmodernity, 22 New German Critique 3 (Winter
1981); Burger, Avant-Garde and Contemporary Aesthetics: A Reply to Jfirgen Habermas, 22 New
German Critique 19 (Winter 1981).
41. See BUrger, supra note 38, at 12-13.
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The fifth approach to popular culture and the one which best charac-
terizes the following effort to map law and the popular arts may be re-
ferred to as the "sociology of culture." This category has been given such
broad intellectual jurisdiction in recent decades that even a selective bibli-
ography would far outrun the length of this essay. The two main aspects
of this fifth approach, for my purposes, are (1) a willingness to consider
both intuitive and more empirical or systematic kinds of knowledge and
insight, and (2) an effort to juxtapose an individual work or instance with
a broader form of social reality, what Fredric Jameson calls "jumping of a
spark between two poles.""4 Jameson provides an intriguing illustration of
this method of juxtaposition from the writing of Theodor W. Adorno:
It is hardly an accident that mathematical techniques in music as
well as logical positivism originated in Vienna. The fondness for
number games is as peculiar to the Viennese mind as the game of
chess in the coffee house. There are social reasons for it. All the
while intellectually productive forces in Austria were rising to the
technical level characteristic of high capitalism, material forces
lagged behind. The resultant unused capacity for figures became the
symbolic fulfillment process of the Viennese intellectual. If he
wanted to take part in the actual process of material production, he
had to look for a position in Imperial Germany. If he stayed home,
he became a doctor or a lawyer or clung to number games as a mi-
rage of financial power. Such is the way the Viennese intellectual
tries to prove something to himself, and-bitte sch6n!-to everyone
else as well.'
3
My point is not that Adorno's specific analysis here is "correct"-rather
that the sociology of culture includes just the kind of critique which
Adorno deploys in his attempt to decipher the aesthetic and intellectual
pastimes of Viennese society. And it is this sort of critique with which I
42. F. Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature 4
(1971).
43. T. Adorno, Philosphie der neuen Musik (1958), quoted in id. at 7. For an historian's effort in
the sociology of culture see R. Evans, Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years,
1830-1910 (1987). Gordon Craig comments on how Evans uses the cholera years, in particular the
1892 cholera epidemic in Hamburg, to reveal the larger contours of society and politics in the late
nineteenth century. Craig, Politics of a Plague, N.Y. Rev. Books, June 30, 1988, at 9, 9-10. Evans
specifically juxtaposes the bourgeoisie's preference for miasmatic theory of cholera's spread (a prefer-
ence which led to an undervaluation of contagion theory and Koch's discovery of the cholera bacillus
as well as perhaps thousands more deaths) with the bourgeoisie's existing emphasis upon sanitation
and sobriety as solutions to the physical and moral degradation of the poor at the hands of an ex-
panding industrial capitalism, an ominous politicization of epidemiology with obvious implications for
present history. Id. at 10-11. See also Chase, Fear Eats the Soul, 94 Yale L.J. 1253 (1985) (similar
effort within the sociology of culture to juxtapose point with Gestalt field, in this case the resistance of
late-nineteenth century British common law judges to recognize the defense of necessity in criminal
cases involving survival cannibalism-in spite of precedent and legislative recommendations favoring
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feel most comfortable in trying to link together the "two incommensurable
realities" of American popular culture and law and the legal profession.
Beyond this necessarily brief excursion into the range of choices offered
by contemporary cultural criticism, this set of five divergent styles of cri-
tique, it is also useful to observe that there are many prevalent techniques
currently utilized within cultural criticism. These techniques constitute
relatively autonomous investigative tools and thus, not surprisingly, cut
across the boundaries created by the notions of critique advanced above.
Such techniques certainly include psychoanalytic,"' semiological, 4 author-
ship (or "auteur")," and genre-based theory," as well as criticism which
takes the star system in the movies' 8 as its point of departure. If I have
not chosen these particular techniques for immediate use here, it is not
because they cannot be usefully employed in the study of law and popular
culture. On the contrary, all of the techniques cited either have or soon
will have been put to use in analyzing popular legal culture. I have cho-
sen the technique of gender-based analysis as an entry point to the sociol-
ogy of culture simply because the example of popular legal culture se-
lected here, Scott Turow's novel Presumed Innocent, makes gender-based
theory and its implications difficult to escape. The technique remains, at
the same time, no more than a single corridor into the great hall of cul-
ture's sociology.
V. GENDER-BASED THEORY
One of the most widely practiced forms of gender-based theory, "images
of women" criticism, 4" is now regarded by some feminist theoreticians as
rather primitive. To be sure, no critical perspective in the U.S. has devel-
oped more rapidly or with greater sophistication over the last two decades
44. See, e.g., C. Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema (C. Britton, A.
Williams, B. Brewster & A. Guzetti trans. 1982); E. Wright, Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in
Practice (1984); Literature and Psychoanalysis, the Question of Reading: Otherwise (S. Felman ed.
1982); K. Gabbard & G.O. Gabbard, The Psychiatrist at the Movies, in Psychiatry and the Cinema
175 (1987); Holland, Schizoanalysis: The Postmodern Contextualization of Psychoanalysis, Marxism
and the Interpretation of Culture 405 (C. Nelson & L. Grossberg eds. 1988); The Trials of Psychoa-
nalysis, 13 Critical Inquiry 215 (Winter 1987).
45. See, e.g., S. Heath, Questions of Cinema (1981); C. MacCabe, Tracking the Signifier, Theo-
retical Essays: Film, Linguistics, Literature (1985).
46. See, e.g., Cahiers du Cinema: The 1950s, Neo-Realism, Hollywood, New Wave (J. Hillier
ed. 1985); C. Crisp, Preface to Eric Rohmer: Realist and Moralist (1988).
47. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 25, at 563-67; H. Dubrow, Genre (1982); Film Genre Reader
(B. Grant ed. 1986); S. Neale, Genre (1980); U. Eco, Travels in Hyper Reality (W. Weaver trans.
1986).
48. See, e.g., Elsaesser, Film History as Social History: The Dieterle/Warner Brothers Bio-Pic, 8
Wide Angle 15, 16 (1986, No. 2) ("During the three decades from 1930 to 1960, genres and the star
system supplied the main discourses whereby the Hollywood film industry communicated with its
audiences."); King, Stardom as an Occupation in The Hollywood Film Industry 154 (P. Kerr, ed.
1986).
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than has feminist theory." But just as the images of women perspective
has provided a starting point in the past for some figures transforming
feminist criticism today, it may still provide a starting point for those un-
familiar with gender-based analysis of literature and culture. Further,
gender-based theory will be used here in a way which, hopefully, avoids
some of the criticism of "images of women" cultural analysis.
In a recent, important overview, feminist critic Toril Moi argues that
"to study 'images of women' in fiction is equivalent to studying false
images of women in fiction written by both sexes. The 'image' of women
in literature is invariably defined in opposition to the 'real person' whom
literature somehow never quite manages to convey to the reader."'51 On
the one hand, the value in such an approach to literature, according to
Moi, is that it emphasizes "the way in which writers constantly select the
elements they wish to use in their texts." 2 Thus, applied to Scott Turow's
novel, "images of women" criticism has the advantage of reminding us
that the women in Presumed Innocent are not "real women" whom we
might feel compelled to defend or criticize but are, in fact, simply cre-
ations of a particular male novelist's imagination, rendered within a par-
ticular work of his. In a sense, what may require defense is not what
Turow's women do but rather why he chooses to have them engage the
world as they do. Turow's relationship to his female characters, or the
relationship between actual American women and those reconstructed in
the imaginative art of male novelists, may turn out to be more important
or more revealing than any of the relationships between characters within
a particular novel.
On the other hand, Moi is primarily interested in raising sharp ques-
tions about images of women critique, and I, having already expressed my
own concern with the tendency of some critics to overestimate the impact
of legal ideology (or ideology conveyed through popular art and elite cul-
ture) on the way most people actually live, am inclined to agree with
Moi's observation that
[l]iterary works can and should of course be criticized for having
selected and shaped their fictional universe according to oppressive
and objectionable ideological assumptions, but that should not be
confused with failing to be 'true to life' or with not presenting 'an
authentic expression of real experience.' Such an insistent demand
for authenticity not only reduces all literature to rather simplistic
50. See, e.g., Abraham, Modern Romancers, The Nation, July 2/9, 1988, at 27, 27. For the
extraordinary developments within legal studies in even less time, see Women in Legal Educa-
tion-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice, 38 J. Legal Educ. 1 (March/June 1988); C. MacKin-
non, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (1987); Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A
Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 Am. U.L. Rev. 1065 (1985).
51. T. Moi, supra note 49, at 44-45.
52. Id. at 45.
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forms of autobiography, it also finds itself ruling the greater part of
world literature out of bounds.58
Even if an author's characters do not strike a reader as somehow "true to
life," it does not follow that there must be one, "correct" method of arriv-
ing at some form of truth in or through art-and that, in a particular
case, the novelist or filmmaker or painter has unfortunately failed to em-
brace it. "An insistence on authenticity and truthful reproduction of the
'real world' as the highest literary values inevitably makes the feminist
critic hostile to non-realist forms of writing," concludes Moi, adding that
there simply is "no automatic connection between demands for a full re-
production of the totality of the 'real' and what is known as 'realist' fic-
tion." In other words, there is more than one set of formal means to get
at reality, including the politics of gender. For example, as Brecht sug-
gested early in this century, at no other time in history had realism told us
so little about reality.
I am not preparing a circuitous defense of Presumed Innocent in terms
of gender critique or on "non-realist formal" or aesthetically elaborate
grounds. I am, in fact, convinced that by taking Turow's women (or his
construction of women) seriously, by remaining conscious (as Moi argues
we should) of Turow as master of fictional selection, we can more pre-
cisely situate Presumed Innocent within the context of other manifesta-
tions of popular legal culture during the last few years. Indeed we can do
so (keeping Moi's reservations in mind) without having to rely on a nar-
rowly conceived theory of "true to life" fiction which mechanically distin-
guishes between allegedly authentic and inauthentic writing. We can do so
without requiring Turow to write only autobiography (observed repro-
duction of life) or to become a sociologist of women in the professional
workplace; without confusing images of women criticism and the real ar-
gument about women and freedom, which surely goes beyond the decod-
ing or deconstruction of books and movies into the reality of politics; with-
out, in the end, claiming to have exhausted critical assessment of
Presumed Innocent itself.
What would the author's reaction be to an approach to reading his
work through the lens of "images of women" criticism? We have an idea.
Appearing as part of the promotion for paperback release of Presumed
Innocent throughout the country during June, 1988, Turow answered
questions on a Cable News Network broadcast of the Larry King Show.
King, like nearly every reviewer of Presumed Innocent I am aware of,
53. Id. at 45-46.
54. Id. at 47.
55. One reviewer, novelist Anne Rice, refers to Turow's markedly unsympathetic female princi-
pals, but her very modest complaint is drowned by an ocean of silence from other critics, both legal
and literary, regarding images of women in Presumed Innocent. See, e.g., Wright, The Fictional
Lawyer, 33 Practical Lawyer 90 (Sept. 1987); Lehmann-Haupt, Books of the Times, N.Y. Times,
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simply did not raise the issue of Turow's treatment of women in his novel.
The first caller, a woman from Seattle, Washington, did. She argued that
the women drawn by Turow in his portrait of a big city legal system all
fit a narrow type, and complained that "the only sympathetic woman in
your book was the murderer who the protagonist protects." King then
invited Turow to respond to "criticism of the way you write women."
"Well," Turow paused, "You know.... ... I've obviously heard the
criticism before . . I don't agree with the particular characterization of
the women in Presumed Innocent." He suggested that there were women
in his book who were admirable as well as otherwise and concluded by
saying the important point was that the same thing could be said of the
men he had created. First, if Turow had heard the criticism before, he
still did not seem to have a ready explanation. Second, he seemed to agree
that such a criticism would "obviously" be raised. Third, to describe a
book as having both admirable and less than admirable men as well as
women in it describes virtually all books (including those most generally
criticized for being misogynist) which actually have both men and women
characters in them. But none of this gets to the real problem.
In spite of a wide panorama of characters practicing the arts of urban
amorality, even sexual barbarism, there really are only four central
figures in Presumed Innocent: two men and two women. The relationship
between the men, in this particular kind of American fiction, tends to
require a certain form of relationship between the women. The narrator
and protagonist of the novel, the jaded but nevertheless honest prosecutor
who retains his integrity and sanity even while he becomes a defendant in
a sensational murder trial, is Rosat K. "Rusty" Sabich. Rusty describes
Lipranzer, a police detective, the one person in the world he can genu-
inely trust, this way:
"My best friend," I wrote, "is a cop. He is five foot eight inches tall,
weighs 120 pounds after a full meal, and has a duck-ass hairdo and
that look of lurking small-time viciousness that you've seen on every
no-account kind hanging on a street corner. He smokes two packs of
Camel cigarettes a day. I do not know what we have in common, but
I admire him. He is very good at what he does. . . ." In practice, he
is as solitary as a shooting star. . . . Lip spends most of his time
alone, hanging out in bars and on loading docks, drinking shots with
anybody who's got good information-hoods, reporters, queers, fed-
eral agents, anybody who can keep him up to speed on the world of
big-time bad guys."
With these lines, on page twenty-one of the novel, Presumed Innocent
June 15, 1987, § C, at 15, col. 1. This situation will no doubt change as women law professors begin
to find time to react in print to Turow's perspective.
56. S. Turow, Presumed Innocent 21 (1987).
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effectively ends. From this point on, everything runs true to a familiar
brand of American men's writing; Rusty and Lip are not "queers" (far
from it: gays and racial minorities seem disfavored by the good soldiers of
law and order in Kindle County) but their relationship constitutes the
romance at the heart of Turow's book. From Rusty's characteristic reverie
about his buddy, a good cop, the images of women are fixed permanently
on the developing paper in Turow's darkroom. After this key relationship
comes into focus, Turow more or less reproduces a kind of Hemingway or
Faulkner script, a story of male bonding, the endless struggle of hetero-
sexual American men against loneliness, anxiety, women, and death.
Turow almost seems to have used Leslie Fiedler's Love and Death in the
American Novel'7 as a form of cookbook while concocting this retelling of
Cooper's Leatherstocking Tales, this reworking of themes from The Sun
Also Rises or from Don Siegel's 1964 motion picture The Killers, only
now in the guise of a story about lawyers and American justice.
Thus the caller from Seattle on the Larry King Show, concerned about
the way Turow painted his women characters into the sprawling corrup-
tion of an urban canvas (indeed, "hog butcher to the world" in Presumed
Innocent), clearly seems to me to have been on to something. For both of
us, images of women provide a tipoff, a clue to what is actually going on.
"Through the corrupt city," observes Leslie Fiedler, "the innocent tough
guy who finally sees all, though he is slugged, doped, sapped, shot at, and
bribed on the way to his vision, moves on an immaculate journey. The
undraped daughters of the rich, tight-breasted virgins and nymphomaniac
nightclub entertainers, tempt him with their proffered bodies, but he is
faithful only to his buddies, and like Lambert Strether, to 'what is
right.' "" That Rusty Sabich sees all the city has to offer on his arduous
journey to an acquittal is undeniable. Every form of bribery and tempta-
tion throws the plot for another loop and further obstructs Rusty's angle
of vision on good and evil.
That he submits to one "undraped daughter" of the law, a very seduc-
tive female prosecutor, only makes his eventual return to Lip, to the shin-
ing path ("what is right"), that much more satisfying. The woman with
whom Rusty is obsessed, Carolyn Polhemus, is "wicked. . .naughty...
up to no good,""' the kind of woman who uses sex like a flyswatter, an-
57. L. Fiedler, Love and Death in the American Novel (rev. ed. 1966).
58. Id. at 347. Again, it should be stressed that "what is right" among men in this particular kind
of American fiction excludes homosexual relations. Rusty and Lip are, in this regard, indistinguish-
able from other male action duos regarding their attitude toward sexual politics-indistinguishable,
for example, from such characters as those portrayed by Clint Eastwood and Reni Santoni in Don
Siegel's 1971 cop film Dirty Harry; see Chase, The Strange Romance of Dirty Harry Callahan and
Ann Mary Deacon, 7 Radical America 20, 26 (1973, no. 1).
59. "Thornhill: How did a girl like you ever get to be a girl like you? Eve: Lucky I guess.
Thornhill: Not lucky-wicked. . . naughty . . . up to no good . . .Ever kill anyone?. . . Bet you
could tease a man to death without even trying. (He pats her cheek) So stop trying, hm?" E. Leh-
man, North by Northwest 84 (1959) (screenplay). I include this characterization by Cary Grant of
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other recipe drawn from the classic cuisine of American fiction. Describ-
ing the construction of Faye Greener in Nathanael West's Day of the Lo-
cust, Fiedler observes that Faye "is the blond bitch in all her archetypal
purity, a woman willing at last to take up the role that old Rappaccini
had once vainly dreamed for his daughter: 'to be endowed with marvelous
gifts against which no power and strength could avail an enemy. . . to be
terrible as . . . beautiful.' " "[Tihe blond movie actress, a kind of ersatz
Jean Harlowe [sic]," in West has simply become a big city prosecutor in
Turow." Of course her affair with the hero insures her rather nasty re-
moval from the story.
Meanwhile, Rusty and Lipranzer are true cowboys in the city, happy
rolling camarados, especially in one key sequence where they break down
the door in a housing project apartment, seeking the enemy or evidence or
something. What matters is that they "are good at what they do." This is
Wild West Downtown, so to spealk a male ritual which could easily have
been borrowed from Don Siegel's 1952 horse opera, Duel at Silver Creek
(or innumerable other matinee pictures), where Audie Murphy, guns
blazing, smashes through the front wall of one more outlaw hideout (cf.
Fort Apache/The Bronx), only Murphy does it riding on a horse (put-
ting the prosecutor and his sidekick to shame). So it goes in the male
action drama, a kind of pocket part to Argosy magazine or Guns &
Ammo: boy gets girl, Hart gets horse;" ' Rusty gets Lip ("I never realized
you carry a gun," says Sabich to his pal), and Carolyn Polhemus gets
what's coming to her. "We find the lady raped and bound," says Turow's
tough-talking D.A., Raymond Horgan, "[w]ith some demented slug crack-
ing her skull." ' The "demented slug," of course, turns out to be Barbara,
Rusty's slightly too intellectual, too brooding wife who tries to frame
Rusty for her own savage elimination of Carolyn but, at the same time
removes herself from the story and thus makes way for Rusty's return to
what is right. "[O]ur great novelists," argues Fiedler, "though experts on
indignity and assault, on loneliness and terror . . . , shy away from per-
mitting in their fictions the presence of any full-fledged, mature women,
giving us instead monsters of virtue or bitchery, symbols of the rejection or
fear of sexuality." '
Eva Marie Saint from Hitchcock's North by Northwest not only because it expresses a classic male
conception of what women are up to, one shared by Rusty toward Carolyn, but also because it is
drawn from a film representing a quite different genre from that of the Western or war film, back-
bones of the male action cinema.
60. For discussion of this perception of women by American male novelists, see L. Fiedler, supra
note 57, at 326-27.
61. See, e.g., discussions of William S. Hart's western character in G. Fenin & W. Everson, The
Western: From Silents to the Seventies 74-107 (1973) (Fenin and Everson, incidentally, dedicate their
book to Hart); J. Cawelti, Zane Grey and W.S. Hart" The Romantic Western in the 1920s, in
Adventure, Mystery and Romance 230-41 (1976).
62. S. Turow, supra note 56, at 8.
63. L. Fiedler, supra note 57, at 24.
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"But what about Rusty and Carolyn in bed?" someone will ask, "What
have those encounters got to do with 'the rejection or fear of sexuality'?"
The sexual relationship between Rusty and Carolyn tends to confirm,
rather than erode, the application of Fiedler's perspective to Presumed
Innocent. Rusty describes his most "passionate encounter" with the lady
he cannot live without in this way: "She arched, clearly in some pain.
And I found, suddenly, that I was thrilled. Her head lolled back. Her eyes
held tears. Then she opened them and looked at me directly. Her face was
radiant."' This passage could be read as an interesting version of how
Rusty might describe Barbara's encounter with Carolyn. Given Rusty's
admission that he would prefer killing Carolyn himself if he could not
possess her ("I felt the most desperate wish that she were dead"), s8 one
wonders if he did not find Carolyn's corpse at the crime scene not entirely
lacking in "radiance." Not much distance separates Rusty Sabich's
thoughts from the sentiment expressed in T.S. Eliot's "Sweeney
Agonistes": "Any man has to, needs to, wants to/Once in a lifetime, do a
girl in."" Barbara fails in her effort to "do in" her unfaithful husband
since the ever-faithful Lipranzer, at great personal risk, steals the phan-
tom beer tumbler (which implicates Rusty but good) from the evidence
room. His presentation of this trophy to Rusty as the book closes (who do
we hate more: Carolyn or Barbara?) is, to borrow a title from Peter
Handke, perhaps Presumed Innocent's only "moment of true feeling."
My point is not that Turow's creation of these infinitely dangerous
women fails the "true to life" litmus test; on the contrary, that his fidelity
to reality does not constitute a defense.
The key to understanding the politics of Presumed Innocent is to recog-
nize the way in which Turow displaces his critique of urban corruption,
declining civic institutions, manipulation of the legal system, etc., onto a
critique of sexual politics and thus avoids resolving contradictions raised
by his treatment of lawyers and judges on the loose in the urban jungle.
This is a familiar gambit, one which characterizes in outline the transition
from the proletarian to the tough-guy novel in American fiction during
the 1920s and 1930s. Here Turow repeats this transition but within the
specific context of the lawyer narrative in American popular culture. The
New York Times review of the novel found that Presumed Innocent's
"theme is, unoriginally, the corruption of municipal politics and the para-
dox of rough justice arising out of a cesspool of wrongdoing." It is not
immediately clear what is meant by "rough justice" here (presumably
Rusty's being acquitted rather than Carolyn's being murdered)-but the
notion of "rough justice," arising from big-city adversarial legal practice,
64. S. Turow, supra note 56, at 114.
65. Id. at 141.
66. Quoted in Abraham, supra note 50, at 28.
67. Lehmann-Haupt, supra note 55, at 15, col. 1.
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from the subtle ironies of evidentiary rules in court and client loyalty in
attorney ethics, is never more than a faade for a story whose real theme
is gender.
Turow thus replicates a classic move within American fiction and film,
one which has for years permitted male writers and readers to conceive of
themselves as outsiders, tough guys, even outlaws, without having any-
thing to do with the real world of politics where the action inevitably is
located. "As it descended the long way from Sam Spade to Mike Ham-
mer, the proletarian thriller has come to treat the riddle of guilt and inno-
cence even more perfunctorily, as its occasion rather than its end," ob-
serves Fiedler. As in the tough-guy thrillers, Turow provides "more and
more vulgar sensationalism" and sexual voyeurism to be sure, but pre-
cisely from a kind of elite, professional, insider's perspective. Without
making the mistake of attributing an omnipotence to culture, as in the
dominant ideology theses, we can still suggest that misogyny in male fic-
tion becomes a kind of insulation from responsibility for social change."
Within the modest ambitions of a sociology of culture, however, and
given our rejection of both the dominant ideology thesis and the "false
portrait of reality" version of images of women critique, from what stand-
point have we gone beyond the explication of images of women in
Turow's work in the direction of sharply criticizing that work? On what
foundation do we stand in asserting that we are troubled by a particular
work of fiction? "Criticism first appears as a denial; its basic gesture is a
refusal," observes Pierre Macherey:
Yet it intends to supply a knowledge, and the authority that it ap-
propriates should be acknowledged as decisive. . . . It expresses a
knowledge, even though it might be a subjective knowledge (that
contradiction in terms). . . .Criticism demonstrates its power over
the work, for in the space generated by that initial gesture of refusal
and separation there is born a new and perhaps different object,
something which only criticism could have brought to life. Refusing
to accept the given work as definitive, and emphasising rather its
modifications, the critical judgment affirms the presence of the other,
of the elsewhere which ratifies judgment.6
It is clear that Macherey, as well as some other contemporary, left-
wing critics of literature, believe it is possible to measure the quality of a
literary work by a yardstick other than popularity with an affluent mar-
ket of readers, technical mastery by the author of the particular literary
form within which he or she is working, or fidelity to some narrowly
conceived notion of "reality" or accuracy in reporting. Yet "the elsewhere
68. L. Fiedler, supra note 57, at 499-500.
69. P. Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production 16 (G. Wall trans. 1978).
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which ratifies judgment" (thus criticism) for Macherey cannot be ade-
quately located here, at the very conclusion of this introduction to how we
might analyze law and popular culture. Such exploration requires a more
detailed map, and more distinct figures in the landscape itself, than we
have provided so far.
Nevertheless, if what is specific to the sociology of culture and what
distinguishes it from other approaches to critique, is its emphasis on the
relation between an individual work or instance and a broader field upon
which it draws, we might seek, like Werner Herzog's relentless Fitzcar-
raldo, a more elaborate middle tier of analysis upon which to shoulder the
analytic burden of moving from specific works to that broader field which
is, ultimately, society itself. How might this be done?
Suppose we position Presumed Innocent at one end of a gender-based
spectrum of representation (perhaps terminating at the opposite end in the
images of women-lawyers, judges, crime victims and clients-in the tele-
vision serial L.A. Law) and then proceed by attempting to generate
Fredric Jameson's spark of recognition, if not between point and field,
then at least between two middle tiers of analysis; between a gender-based
and a genre-based spectrum of images and values. Both gender-based and
genre-based series would include the same works or instances (adding
critical motion pictures like Jagged Edge, Suspect, The Big Easy, and Le-
gal Eagles). What is so striking about this middle-tier juxtaposition is
that the two series can be superimposed on each other; they seem to "fit
together."
Moving from Presumed Innocent through L.A. Law, in terms of a
spectrum of negative to more positive images of women, we encounter the
same sequence of popular works as if we were moving, on the genre spec-
trum, from the "police procedural" of Ed McBain (Presumed Innocent),
through police/detective (Jagged Edge), detective/mystery (Suspect), mys-
tery/romance (The Big Easy), romantic comedy/social melodrama (Legal
Eagles), to urban or metropolitan social melodrama-the latter constitut-
ing what some might regard as the "master discourse" of popular narra-
tive about American law and lawyers for most of this century. From the
pages of Louis Auchincloss to the images in films like The Young Phi-
ladelphians, then to the top of the television ratings in NBC's L.A. Law,
social melodrama has constituted an important source of information re-
garding American attitudes toward legal lifestyles and politics. The spe-
cific structural alterations in the genre provided by L.A. Law (as well as
the synthesis of lawyer narrative with police procedural, an unprecedented
development pioneered by Scott Turow at bestseller altitude) confirm the
continuing utility of genre-based analysis for cultural theory. "The strate-
gic value of generic concepts . . . ," suggests Jameson, "clearly lies in the
mediatory function of the notion of genre, which allows the coordination
of immanent formal analysis of the individual text with the twin
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diachronic perspective of the history of forms and the evolution of social
life."70
From individual works of popular culture through the mediatory func-
tion performed by techniques such as gender and genre analysis, to the far
shore of the evolution of social life (or, as future studies must pursue, the
evolution and contemporary erosion of elite control within the American
legal profession, itself a reflection of general challenges to control over the
social structure of accumulation within the American political economy), I
have staked out here but one of many promising lines of inquiry into the
sociology of culture generally as well as, in particular, the sociology of
popular legal consciousness in the United States.
70. Jameson, supra note 36, at 106. For a discussion of Jameson's analysis see M. Sprinker,
Imaginary Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Theory of Historical Materialism 153-76 (1987).
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